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Human Adjustment 
to Technological Change: 
An Economisas View 
Arthur A. Kruger 
The focus of this paper is to examine how collective 
bargaining has attempted to cope with the problems of worker 
displacement and how thèse developments might indicate future 
trends in union-management relations as well as the limitations 
of collective bargaining. 
Introduction 
Over the past décade 1, there has been considérable discussion of 
the problems of adapting workers to change. The debate was sparked by 
the rise in unemployment levels in Canada and the United States in the 
period 1957-1961 and the accompanying spread of new technology 
symbolized by the computer. Economists began to discuss the issue of 
structural unemployment — a spécial type of unemployment resulting from 
rapid shifts in technology and consu-
mer demand2. The proponents of 
the structuralist position pressed for 
1
 This study was financée! by a grant from the Task Force on Labour Relations. 
A somewhat more comprehensive version of this paper was submitted to the Task 
Force as Project No. 45. 
The author is indebted to Mr. E. Lightman, a graduate student at the University 
of California (Berkeley, California), who provided invaluable assistance in this study. 
Mr. Lightman did most of the work in assembling the materials for the case studies 
in which some of the findings of this study are based. 
2
 For an excellent discussion of this subject see WINDER, J.W.L., « Structural 
Unemployment » in A. Kruger and N.M. Meltz (éd.), The Canadian Labour Market : 
Readings in Manpower Economies, Toronto : University of Toronto, Centre for 
Industrial Relations, 1968. 
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the development of manpower programmes to speed the adjustment of 
labour supply to thèse demand changes. Others urged a more; radical 
rethinking of the relative rôles of work and leisure. They wanted pro-
grammes designed to prépare men not for new jobs but for a future in 
which work would be insignificant and output would be procured largely 
by machines 3. 
Much of this debate centered on the question of whether or not 
technological change was proceeding at a rate so différent from the past 
that it posed entirely new adjustment problems which required vastly 
différent institutions and attitudes from those developed heretofore. 
This debate, as well as the expérience of change and worker displace-
ment in many industries, influenced the thinking of corporate and union 
officiais as well as governments. In collective bargaining the emphasis 
shifted somewhat to matters such as work rules, seniority rules. the âge 
of retirement, the level of pension benefits, severance pay and supplementary 
unemployment benefits. AU of thèse mechanisms were commonly found 
in existing coUective agreements. Unions sought to use thèse readily 
available devices to facilitate the adaptation of workers to displacement. 
Managements were reluctant to give way because they feared that such 
programmes committed companies to unpredictable costs and also because 
they often inhibited the firms in applying new technology. 
In some cases, union leaders and management worked out bold new 
programmes designed to facilitate worker adjustment to technological 
change without unduly inhibiting the corporation's ability to implement 
change. The most interesting and important cases on this continent are 
described in Appendices II, III, and IV of my Report to the Task Force 
on Labour Relations 4. 
Governments also responded by re-thinking the rôle of vocational 
training in éducation, and by expanding programmes for adult retraining. 
Research was undertaken on forecasting manpower requirements. Other 
new areas of state activity opened up including manpower mobiUty assist-
ance and subsidies to encourage industrial expansion in depressed areas. 
In this paper I want to draw together some of the diverse information 
which bears on the problem of adjusting to technological change through 
3 See «The Triple Révolution», Advertising Age, April 6, 1964 or PIEL, G., 
Consumers of Abundance, Centre for the Study of Démocratie Institutions, 1961. 
4 KRUGER, Arthur, Human Adjustment to Industrial Conversion, Project No 45, 
Task Force on Labour Relations, Ottawa, 1968. 
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collective bargaining. I will discuss first some of the insights which 
économie theory can provide in evaluating the attempts to adjust to 
technological change at the level of the firm or industry. In section II 
below I will présent an analysis of the costs and benefits of change and 
of programmes designed to adapt to change as they are viewed by 
workers, union leaders, management and governments. Section III reviews 
some noteworthy experiments (mostly through collective bargaining) in 
coping with worker adaptation to change. In section IV, I will examine 
some proposais originating in Canada for handling displacement. The 
final section provides a summary of the findings. 
I will not discuss the issue of the pace of current and future 
technological change relative to that in the past. Nor will I enter the 
debate on the future relevance of work. Rather I will assume that change 
is proceeding at a pace which does create problems of adjustment for 
many workers and that paid employment will continue to be important 
to most of the adult population in the foreseeable future. 
Technological Change — Costs and Benefits 
Each party, confronted with the prospect of change, will attempt 
to assess the likely costs and benefits of the innovation. On the basis of 
this appraisal, the parties will détermine the attitudes toward the change 
and toward the pace of adoption of change. In this section I will examine 
the costs and benefits of technological change as viewed by each of the 
parties. With this we can see the limits of managements willingness to make 
concessions in order to receive worker and union approval for change as 
well as the factors influencing worker and union attitude to change. The 
factors determining the économie costs and benefits for society also will 
be examined. 
THE SOURCE AND MEASUREMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Macro-Economie Measure of Change 
Although our focus is on the subject of technological change at the 
micro-economic (firm or industry) level, we might begin by noting a few 
factors concerning technological change at the macro (economy-wide) 
level. The traditional measure of technological change at the macro-
economic level is change in output per unit of labour input. Output is 
most commonly expressed in terms of the dollar value of total production 
and labour input is measured by the number of man-hours expended in 
producing this output. 
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There are numerous problems associated with this measure. Thèse 
hâve been discussed extensively elsewhere and we need not do more 
than enumerate some of the more critical problems hère. First, of course, 
the focus on the labour input should not imply that changes in the effort 
or quality of labour are the sole or even the most significant sources of 
rising output. Changes in the quality and quantity of other factors of 
production (capital, raw materials and land) are also relevant. Récogni-
tion of this fact has resulted in the increased use of measures which treat 
explicitly the inputs of ail the relevant factors. Furthermore, our measure 
of change will be influenced by such variables as the distribution of output 
among sectors as well as by changes in the quality of inputs or in the 
method of combining inputs. The reader interested in pursuing this 
matter further can turn to one of the numerous récent studies on this 
subject5. 
Micro-Economie Measure of Change 
Our major concern is with change at the plant, firm or induslxy since 
it is at this level that the parties to collective bargaining attempt to cope 
with change. Hère change is usually measured by the extent to which 
production costs per unit of output are altered. However, it is useful to 
distinguish between alternative sources of unit cost changes. First, costs 
may be altered because priées of some or ail of the inputs used by this 
firm or industry hâve changed. This change is highly significant to the firm 
or industry but it is not deemed to be a technological change in the affected 
firm or industry. Rather it reflects changes elsewhere, namely in the 
industries supplying thèse inputs. The input priées may hâve been altered 
by technological change in the input supplying sectors or by other market 
forces (e.g. the degree of compétition, shifting opportunity costs, changing 
demand) in thèse and related markets. 
Then, a firm (or industry) may alter the scale of output in response 
to either changing input priées or changes in demand for its product (or 
both). The new output level chosen may involve a change in unit costs 
of production and may also resuit in some altération in the mix of factor 
5 See KENDRICK, J.W., Productivity Trends in the United States, Princeton : 
Princeton University Press, 1961 ; DENISON, E.F., The Sources of Economie Growtk 
in the United States and the Alternatives Before Us, New York : Committee on 
Economie Development, Supplementary Paper No. 13, 1962 ; KOTOWITZ, Y., « Tech-
nological Progress and Labour Displacement» in A. Kruger and N.M. Meltz, The 
Canadian Labour Market, Toronto : Centre for Industrial Relations, University of 
Toronto, 1968; KOTOWITZ, Y., «Production Functions in Canadian Manufacturing 
1926-39 and 1947-61 » (Unpublished mimeo.). 
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inputs. This is often viewed as a case of technological change when it 
results in an altération in the mix of factor inputs. HoWever, it is caused 
by a shift in output level which involves a change in the choice of known 
technologies rather than by the discovery and implementation of a new 
technology. 
The final source of cost change is the resuit of the discovery and 
application of new technology (new methods of combining inputs, or new 
inputs) which cuts production costs for the desired output level. This is 
often deemed to be the only meaningful use of the term technological 
change as it applies to firm or industry supply. 
There is not much point in entering into the debate on whether ail 
of thèse changes or only the last kind should be classified as technological 
change. The fact is that usually two or ail three of thèse changes occur 
simultaneously and often one such change triggers off changes of another 
type. (For example, higher input priées may alter the desired scale of 
output, or application of new techniques may alter input priées.) Although 
it is useful to distinguish among thèse three sources of cost change, in 
practice the available measures encompass their combined impact and 
there is no ready way of disentangling them. 
So far we hâve focused on the input side of our measure of techno-
logical change — input cost per unit of output. Another significant change 
may be a shift to new kinds of outputs by the firm. This may be the resuit 
of the discovery of a new product or new uses for a known product which 
raise demand for it. It may also reflect the discovery of new ways of 
producing a product which lower costs and make production of this 
product more attractive than heretofore. Thèse events would also be covered 
by the term technological change. However, the production of the new 
product may reflect changing consumer tastes, or changing priées in other 
product markets or shifts in input priées which at best are only indirectly 
the resuit of technological changes, or which may hâve nothing to do with 
changing technology. 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND LABOUR DISPLACEMENT 
Popular discussion of the subject often assumes that technological 
change is inherently labour displacing. This is not necessarily true either 
at the macro or micro level. At the macro level the degree of unemployment 
created by such changes is a function of the level and composition of 
aggregate demand, the degree of compétition and mobility in markets, 
as well as the pace of discovery and implementation of new methods. It is 
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not possible to untangle the portion of unemployment attributable to 
technological change or to other sources. Attempts such as the study by 
Horne, Gillen and Helling, A Survey of Labour Market Conditions in 
Windsor, Ontario-1964 A Case Study (Ottawa: Economie Council of 
Canada) produce nothing that is meaningful. This problem is also demon-
strated in the rather fruitless debate between the structuraliste and the 
déficient demand schools of economists over the relative rôle of thèse 
factors in creating unemployment6. 
Similarly at the micro level, other factors enter. First the change may 
in fact be such as to raise the labour input required per unit of output at 
the expense of other inputs. Furthermore, if the change so lowers costs 
and priées as to significantly raise output, then total employment may rise 
even when the labour input per unit has fallen. With new products, the 
impact dépends on whether their production uses more or less labour than 
the products which they may replace. 
There is some évidence that on balance, technological change in 
Canadian manufacturing has tended to be labour displacing in the sensé 
that the required labour input per unit of output has fallen. However, total 
employment has held up because of buoyant aggregate demand from a 
variety of sources including expanded sales as a resuit of lower costs and 
lower priées for the products. 
There is no inhérent reason to expect technological change either 
to create or to destroy jobs in the aggregate. The impact of such change 
at the aggregate level dépends on a variety of other factors primarily 
the government's monetary and fiscal policies. What is certain is that 
technological change will create adjustment problems both for labour 
and for management. Such changes will require workers to change their 
occupations, plants, firms, industries or géographie locations. However 
technological change is not the only source of such dislocation. Such 
forces as the discovery of new sources of raw materials or changes in the 
level of aggregate demand or the composition of aggregate demand will 
hâve similar displacement effects. It is worker displacement rather than 
technological change per se that générâtes problems for workers, man-
agement, governments and collective bargaining. (More will be said on 
this subjects in section C which follows.) We should bear in mind that 
much of the debate about automation and many of the collective bargaining 
6 For a good summary of this debate see WINDER, J., « Structural Unemploy-
ment» in Kruger and Meltz (éd.), The Canadian Labour Market, Toronto : Centre 
for Industrial Relations, 1968. 
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experiments designed to cope with technological change reflect the concera 
over the broader problem of adjusting displaced workers whatever the 
source of displacement. 
MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Most economists assume that the prime motive influencing the 
behaviour of corporate management in the marketplace is the désire 
to increase profits. The décision on whether or not to make changes in 
the firm and the timing of change will reflect this désire. Obviously no 
innovation will be adopted unless it is expected to raise profits either 
through lowering production costs or improving product quality so as 
to permit the firm to increase sales or raise the product price. 
Popular discussion of the problem of technological change focuses 
on the discovery of new types of capital equipment which usually are 
assumed to be rapidly adopted and labour displacing. But the problems 
of technological change do not always émerge so suddenly and so 
dramatically. Uusually there is a long time lag between the discovery 
of a new process and the application of the process. 
There are several reasons for the delay. First there is the problem 
of communication. Many new processes remain unknown to some potential 
users for prolonged periods of time. (A good example is the oxygen furnace 
now widely used in steelmaking but unknown on this continent for many 
years after its application in Europe.) 
Even when a new process becomes widely known, it is not usually 
applied immediately. Firms will continue to use existing processes which 
appear to be more expensive as long as the « variable costs » (operating 
costs) of the old process are less than the total costs of the new process. 
Only when existing equipment requires expensive overhaul or replacement 
will the firms adopt the new techniques in préférence to the old. New 
entrants to the industry would of course adopt the best techniques and 
may be in a better profit position than established firms saddled with high 
fixed costs associated with existing plant and equipment. 
Not ail technological change involves the application of recently 
discovered technology. Often the technological change involves the applica-
tion of techniques that hâve been known for some time. The firm may 
choose to apply them because of other changes that may hâve occurred 
to make it more désirable than in the past to employ the new techniques. 
For example, the firm may wish to market a new product for which a long 
established, but never used, technique is best. The firm may wish to change 
the scale on which it opérâtes, as a resuit of changes in product demand 
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or in factor costs. The new level of output may require a change in tech-
nique for the firm to maximize profits. Finally, the relative priées of the 
factors of production might change and this could induce a change in 
technique that shifts the mix of factors in favour of those whose relative 
price has fallen. 
AU of this points to several crucial facts which influence the problem 
of worker adjustment : 
1 ) Firms making technological change expect to dérive financial benefits 
from the change. However, thèse firms may or may not be in a 
favourable profit position. 
2) Where entry is possible, the firm may be following what new entrants 
to the industry hâve already done. In some cases the firm making the 
change may be in a less favourable financial position than the newly 
established firms that use the lower cost equipment from the outset 
and are not faced with fixed charges associated with the earlier 
décisions to operate with other techniques. New firms are seldom 
asked by unions or governments to compensate workers because new 
techniques are employed. Yet older and perhaps less profitable firms 
are expected to assist workers affected by change. 
3) Firms seldom face a sudden décision on technological change. Usually 
the alternative technology is known to the employer and has been 
studied long before change is actually implemented. Only when 
market conditions change sharply or when the new technology permits 
a drastic eut in costs wUl the firm be forced to make a rapid décision 
to adopt new technology. Normally, firms do hâve considérable time 
to engage in consultation with unions, workers and governments, prior 
to implementing a major technological change. The expérience at 
Bowaters Mersey Paper Co. discussed in G.K. Cowan's study provides 
an illustration of the opportunities afforded for such discussions 7. 
4) Technological change in a given industry is not the sole nor even 
necessarily the most important source of worker displacement in that 
industry. Workers may also be displaced because of : 
a. shifts in product demand resulting from changes in income, tastes, 
relative product priées or scope of markets. 
b. shifts in the level of product output resulting from changes in 
costs of production which may occur as a resuit of technological 
7 See COWAN, G.K., Proposed Measures to Facilitate Manpower Adjustment to 
Technological and Other Change, Ottawa : Economie Council of Canada, 1966. 
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change, but which also take place as a resuit of changes in 
factor markets. 
c. shifts in relative factor priées resulting in changes in factor pro-
portions. 
In thèse cases, technological change in other sectors (rival or comp-
lementary products or in factor markets) may be responsible for 
the worker displacement in a given industry. Other forces such as 
the pace of économie growth, tariffs and trade agreements, changes 
in the nature of compétitive conditions in various markets (including 
the labour market) and a variety of government activities may also 
initiate the pressure which ultimately générâtes worker displacement 
in a given sector. Hère the firm or industry may be faced with 
unexpected pressures for rapid change. Displacement cannot be 
planned in advance and may be as extensive in its impact as the 
more widely discussed instances of worker displacement by new 
machines. In our concern with the direct impact of the introduction 
of new technology in a given firm we may loose sight of the important 
and possible more difficult problems of worker dislocation resulting 
from thèse other causes. While the focus of this paper is on 
dislocation due to technological change, much of what is said is 
applicable to the more gênerai problems of worker dislocation 
regardless of the source. 
THE WORKER AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Normally workers hâve little incentive or opportunity for initiating 
technological change. (There are exceptions to this, notably the Scanlon 
Plan or other similar plans.) Rather they are confronted with the prospect 
of change and react to management's décision in this area. 
For workers, such change is usually viewed with fear and suspicion. 
They see few benefits arising from technological change. Even where they 
are persuated that change is the source of économie growth and benefits 
everyone in the long run, they feel often with justification, that changes 
in their own particular firm or industry bring nothing but dislocation and 
problems for them. If this view appears to be short sighted, it is nonetheless 
understandable. Long run gênerai benefits are not as tangible and important 
as immédiate losses both monetary or psychic. (Lord Keynes once noted 
that in the long run we are ail dead.) 
There are cases of course where technological change results in 
upgrading of workers in pay and in the nature of work but workers seldom 
anticipate such favourable impact from change. 
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Workers focus on the costs rather than the benefits of change. The 
costs include not only such monetary costs as loss of income resulting from 
unemployment or a downgrading in occupation. They also include the 
psychic discomforts incurred in adjusting to a new occupation, new co-
workers, a new employer, a différent community and so on. 
The level of adjustment required is a function not only of the 
immédiate impact of the change on a given worker's job, but on how 
the change influences his employer's compétitive position and his employées 
ability to provide him with continued employment. Where a change of 
employer or occupation is involved, the impact on the worker dépends 
on how prepared he is to move to a new occupation, employer or commun-
ity and on the extent to which his potential employment differs from his 
previous position. Thèse in turn dépend on a number of characteristics 
of the workers involved (prior éducation, training or expérience, âge, sex, 
marital status, community attachment, home ownership, accumulated 
savings, etc.) and on the state of the labour market both in his locality 
and elsewhere (with such factors as the level and composition of 
employment and unemployment in his firm, trade, locality and nation 
as the relevant factors). 
In summary, workers seldom see benefits arising from change and 
focus on costs (both monetary and psychic) associated with adjustment 
to change. Given this perspective, it is understandable that the normal 
worker response to the prospect of change is fear and hostility. 
Union policies reflect worker concern over displacement. This in 
part reflects the démocratie structure of many unions and also the désire 
of union leaders to ensure union survival and power. Where technological 
or other changes appear to threaten the employment of union members 
or to enhance managements power to resist union bargaining pressures, 
unions will oppose change. Where no such threat is in prospect but 
workers must adjust to change, unions will accept change but attempt 
to influence the pace of change or to secure arrangements which facilitate 
worker adaptation8. 
8
 An example of this différence in union attitude is the différence in the 
reaction of the railway firemen and the boiler makers to the introduction of the 
diesel engine. The change meant the destruction of their skill and union for the 
firemen whereas the boiler makers and alternative jobs to go to where their skill 
was utilized and where they often remained within their union. The firemen fought 
the innovation longer and harder than did the boiler makers. I am indebted to 
Professor John Dunlop of Harvard University for this example. 
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The objectives of union members and their leaders normally are in 
harmony and this permits agreement on strategy toward change. However 
in some cases, the institutional objectives of union leaders and the goals 
of some or ail of the membership may conflict. Union leaders may sacrifice 
potential benefits for displaced workers (who will leave the union) in 
the interest of greater benefits for those who remain employed or enhanced 
bargaining power for the union. (John L. Lewis' policy in the coal 
industry provides an example of this.) Union leaders may be prepared 
to see their members hurt in cases where union power or survival is 
threatened. In such situations, they may risk the prospect of loss of 
employment for many members for the prospect, however slight, of 
holding power. Through their ability to présent selectively the issues to the 
rank and file, they often get membership support for such risky ventures. 
(The ITU strike at the Toronto newspapers provides a vivid example 
of this.) 
In some cases, union leaders are compelled to choose between the 
interests of conflicting groups within the union. Should older workers' jobs 
be protected by seniority at the expense of younger workers ? Should older 
workers be compelled to retire to permit the younger workers to hold their 
jobs ? Should a curb be placed on overtime work (or other work sharing 
arrangements be imposed) to spread work over a larger group of members 
or should a smaller group get the opportunity to enjoy larger incomes ? 
In assessing union reaction to displacement, we must recognize the 
multiplicity of pressures on union leaders. Some of thèse emanate from 
the rank and file and reflect worker assessments of costs and benefits. 
Various groups of members may hold conflicting views and each group 
will attempt to impose its own position on the union. Others reflect the 
institutional requirements of the union itself and the désire of union 
leaders to retain positions of power and influence which require the 
préservation of the union and the enhancement of union strength. 
THE GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN CHANGE 9 
Certain areas of government concern with change are well known. 
Modem governments are committed to policies promoting économie growth. 
Technological change is a crucial variable determining the growth rate. 
9 For further discussion of the basis for government concern and for an 
évaluation of public policy in this area see KRUGER, A. and N.M. MELTZ, The 
Canadian Labour Market, Toronto : Centre for Industrial Relations, 1968, particularly 
the articles by Kruger, Winder and Drummond. For further discussions of public 
policy goals see ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, Fourth Annual Review, Ottawa : 
Queen's Printer, 1967, page 2. 
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Unemployment is also a matter of public concern. Governments hâve 
accepted the objective of reducing unemployment to an « acceptable level > 
and of assisting those temporarily unemployed. The state, therefore, is 
concerned lest change resuit in an undue amount of unemployment. As part 
of the growth and stabilization goals, the governments seek to check 
inflationary pressures and préserve the exchange value of our dollar. Cost 
cutting, technological and other changes contribute to thèse goals. Keyn-
esian policies designed to raise aggregate demand are the primary device 
for checking unemployment, or inflation. 
There has been some concern over whether thèse policies can work 
effectively when unemployment and inflation occur simultaneously to a 
degree that is deemed unacceptable 10. There is also the matter of the 
impact of Keynesian policies on the long run growth rate. Economists are 
tiot in agreement on this question. Governments appear to accept and 
utilize the Keynesian tools albeit with some reluctance and skepticism. 
They seek to supplément them with other devices including manpower 
programmes. Thèse are designed to assist workers in adapting to displace-
ment and hopefully also to curb inflation and promote growth. 
It is relatively easy to measure the cost of public information, training, 
mobility and locational incentive programmes which form the core of 
public policy in this area. It is more difficult to measure the social benefits 
of thèse policies. This involves such matters as value judgments on the 
weight to be placed on the suffering of the unemployed, the benefits of 
maintaining community ties, and so on. There are also serious measurement 
problems (even after thèse value judgments are made) in determining the 
impact of thèse policies in such areas as relative and absolute priées 
including factor priées such as wage rates and salaries. 
SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
In discussing the desirability of technological change and the un-
desirable features of such change, we must recognize at the outset that 
the assessment of costs and benefits varies greatly within society. 
To management, such changes are essential for the health and even 
survival of their firms. Technological change reduces costs and is seen as 
désirable. The pace of change dépends on a comparison of operating costs 
(ignoring fixed costs) using existing techniques against total costs with 
!0 See WINDER, J.W.L., «Structural Unemployment» in A. Kruger and N.M. 
Meltz (éd.), The Canadian Labour Market : Readings in Manpower Economies, 
Toronto : Centre for Industriel Relations, University of Toronto, 1968. 
HUMAN ADJUSTMENT TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE : AN ECONOMISTES VIEW 277 
the proposed innovation. Firms usually know well in advance that a major 
change will occur. Although technological change tends to enhance profits, 
firms making the change are not necessarily highly profitable and often 
are hard pressed by new entrants (or foreign competitors) who hâve 
adopted the improved techniques unencumbered either by fixed costs or 
pressure to compensate displaced workers. 
Workers normally react negatively to technological change. They 
know from expérience that change disrupts the social System at the work 
place, threatens jobs and skills, and can undermine or destroy their union. 
They seldom anticipate benefits from such changes. Union leaders wiîl 
oppose any change that threatens the survival of the union. Other changes 
normally are accepted by the union in principle, but through collective 
bargaining attempts are made to mitigate the impact on the displaced 
union members. The union in some cases may assist management in 
securing worker acceptance of change. 
Governments are ambivalent toward major technological changes. 
They désire such changes because of the favourable impact of the rate 
of économie growth, price stability and the foreign trade balance. However, 
they face strong pressures to assist workers and communities wherever the 
change involves significant dislocation. Change brings long term social 
benefits but dislocation involves immédiate pressures on the public treasury. 
In gênerai, governments encourage technological change and use a mix of 
Keynesian and other policies (e.g. industriel location and manpower pro-
grammes) to alleviate the impact on those bearing the heaviest cost of 
change. Thèse programmes hâve an impact beyond the assistance to the 
dislocated and their side effects are often dysfunctional. 
Collective Bargaining and Technological Change 
In this part of the study I want to deal with the empirical évidence 
on attempts to cope with worker displacement through collecive bar-
gaining. Those interested in Canadian cases involving attempts to adapt 
to worker displacement through collective bargaining should consult the 
following studies : 
F. QUINET, The Collective Agreement in Canada : The Study of its 
Contents and of its Rôle in a Changing Industrial Environment, 
especially pages 33-116. (Ottawa, Department of Labour, Eco-
nomies and Research Branch, 1967). 
Canada, Department of Labour, Economies and Research Branch, 
Response to Technological Change : A Study of Technological 
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Change Provisions Contained in Major Collective Agreements 
Effective in Canadian Industries, a study by David Ross. (Ot-
tawa, Department of Labour, Economies and Research Branch, 
1967). 
Ontario Department of Labour, Technological Change in Ontario 
Collective Agreements : Ten Manufacturing Industries, by D. 
PLAUTZ. (Toronto : Research Branch, Ontario Department of 
Labour, 1967). 
G.K. COWAN, Proposed Measures to Facilitate Manpower Adjustment 
to Technological and Other Changes : Twelve Selected Case 
Studies. (Ottawa, Economie Council of Canada). 
Ail of thèse studies provide valuable information on attempts to 
cope with technological change through collective bargaining. It is un-
fortunate that coordination was not possible in designing thèse various 
studies (including my own). Only the Cowan study employs a methodology 
which identifies firms and thus permits intégration with my own findings. 
The other studies, (sponsored by the Canadian Department of Labour 
and the Ontario Department of Labour) provide a great deal of relevant 
material on the extent and nature of collective bargaining provisions 
designed to cope with technological change. However, they do not identify 
the firms involved and therefore cannot be directly integrated with the 
material collected for this paper. They do provide a very valuable picture 
of Canadian expérience and I will begin by summarizing some of their 
critical findings. 
THE SURVEYS OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS IN CANADA 
The Ross Study : 
For some years now the Canada Department of Labour has compiled 
statistics on the content of collective agreements in Canada. Thèse studies, 
under the direction of Mr. Félix Quinet, use the extensive file of collective 
agreements in the Department to show the extent to which various pro-
visions (e.g. pensions, seniority, etc.) are found in thèse contracts. 
In récent years particular emphasis has been placed on those clauses 
which are designed to cope with technological change, or which can be 
applied to this problem. Four of the eight papers by Félix Quinet, in the 
volume referred to above, are devoted to this problem. The study by 
D. Ross, under the direction of Mr. Quinet, is the latest in this group of 
studies and it is the findings of the Ross Study that I want to summarize 
first. 
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Ross used a survey of agreements covering 471 companies, each 
employing 500 or more workers. (He excluded construction companies 
and the railways). The contracts were in force in 1966. Ross includes 
only those contractual clauses which state explicitly that they are designed 
to cope with problems of worker displacement and excludes clauses which 
might serve this purpose but are not so designated. The relevant clauses 
are then grouped under the following headings : 
advance notice ; income maintenance (e.g. severance pay, S.U.B., 
etc.) ; worker adaptation (e.g. retraining, mobility, grants, etc.) ; 
employment sharing (e.g. shorter work week, early retirement, etc.) ; 
joint union management procédures (e.g. study committees). 
His most important findings are summarized in the following quo-
tation : 
« Of the 471 agreements, 28% contained explicit technological change 
clauses. The largest number of thèse clauses were income maintenance 
provisions, largely severance pay. However, 16 agreements provided 
complète income security for the workers extending for an indefinite 
period of time. Only five agreements contained employment-sharing 
provisions. Of interest also is the fact that although only 133 collective 
agreements were found to contain technological change provisions, 277 
separate provisions were surveyed. This seems to indicate that in many 
a technological change context, a combination of provisions is often 
called for in dealing with the problems generated by new technology. » 
(Response to Technological Change, pp. 3-4) 
The tables from the Appendix to Professor Ross' study summarize 
the findings on the degree to which différent kinds of provisions occur. 
Income maintenance provisions are the most common kind of arrange-
ments, employment-sharing the least used, and the other three kinds of 
provisions about equally prévalent. Where advanced notice is found, it 
is usually accompanied by a severance pay provision. Retraining pro-
visions are much more prévalent than relocation as an adaptation device. 
The few employment-sharing contracts appear to use the reduced work 
week rather than early retirement. Union-management procédures tend 
to rely on consultation rather than negotiation or arbitration. 
The Plautz Study : 
The Ontario survey conducted bùy Mr. Dieter Plautz under the 
direction of Mr. John Kinley, is limited to the plants of ten manufacturing 
industries located in Ontario. This study follows the Ross approach in 
including only those contractual clauses that explicitly indicate that they 
are designed to facilitate the adjustment of workers displaced by techno-
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logical change (defined hère broadly enough to include most forms of 
displacement and not merely technological change in the more usual sensé 
of this term). 
The survey included 1,078 agreements in 1,023 establishments co-
vering 218,000 production and related workers in thèse ten industries. 
They were the most récent contracts on file at the Ontario Department 
of Labour on March 31, 1967. The clauses were grouped somewhat 
differently from the catégories employed by the Ross study. The Ontario 
study used the following classification System : 
advanced notice and consultation ; changes in job content and rates 
of pay (e.g. job classification, rate and manning requirements) ; 
job security (e.g. attrition, shorter hours, seniority, relocation, re-
training, etc.) ; cushioning the impact of job change and job loss 
(e.g. severance pay, retraining, relocation, etc.) ; sharing the gains 
of productivity. 
Plautz found that 334 agreements (31%) covering 149,000 wor-
kers (68%) had clauses specifically designed to cope with problems 
arising as a resuit of change. This indicates that provisions of this kind 
are more likely to be found in larger than in smaller plants. 
They are more common in some sectors than in others. Rubber, 
transportation equipment and primary metals show the greatest propensity 
to use them. Chemicals, méat products and machinery are at the other 
extrême. Paper, printing and métal fabricating occupy an intermediate 
position. Within sectors, larger firms are more likely than smaller ones to 
hâve such provisions. 
The findings of the Ontario study with respect to the frequency of 
the various catégories of clauses are summarized in the tables on pages 
65-71 of the Plautz study. Of particular interest for our purposes are 
the last two tables where the frequency of various kind of clauses is 
classified by industry and size of the bargaining unit respectively. This 
permits some, albeit limited, comparison with the findings of Cowan and 
our own survey to be discussed below. 
If we compare the Ross and Plautz findings, we see that the two 
studies show similar results on the matter of the frequency with which 
one, two, three or more contractural provisions are found. However, the 
important différences in the method of classification used indicates that 
this resuit is not very meaningful. On other matters the results are not 
consistent. The Ross study indicates that income maintenance occurs in 
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about 40% of the contracts. In the Ontario study « cushioning » provisions 
which if anything, is even broader than Ross' income maintenance occurs 
in only 30% of the agreements. This may be explained by Plautz's exclu-
sion of severance pay under S.U.B. agreements. Différences in other cat-
égories cannot readily be reconciled because of différences in the grouping 
of clauses in thèse two studies. 
The two studies agrée on the frequency of advanced notice and joint 
procédures. In contrast to Ross, Plautz finds attrition more common than 
shorter hours. Both agrée that thèse sorts of arrangements are not too 
common. They are not too far apart in their findings on retraining and 
relocation provisions. 
It is most unfortunate that the two studies did not employ common 
methods of classification which would permit further comparison. It is 
also unfortunate that the fédéral study does not disclose information class-
ified by industry or by size of firm as does the Ontario study. Neither 
study provides the necessary data on such other variables as compétitive 
conditions in the relevant labour markets or économie conditions when 
the agreements were signed which could be useful in establishing the con-
ditions conducive to various sorts of contractual arrangements. Finally, 
in my opinion, both suffer as a resuit of the décision to count only con-
tractual provisions which state explicitly that they are linked to the 
problem of worker displacement. Often the parties will utilize long standing 
provisions to cope with displacement problems. Even where such pro-
visions are negotiated in response to technological change, the contract 
will not necessarily state this. This is supported by Quinet who has said : 
« It would indeed appear that technological change can, in fact, lead 
to the formulation of numerous agreement provisions that will not 
necessarily make an open and obvious référence to the problems from 
which they resuit. » (Quinet, The Collective Agreement in Canada, 
page 53.) 
Thus thèse two surveys, important as they are for their broad co-
verage of Canadian expérience, are of limited value in my own study which 
utilizes a différent technique, closer in its approach to the Cowan, than 
to the Ross or Plautz papers. 
THE COWAN-KRUGER « CASE STUDIES » 
The agreements described in Mr. Cowan's study and in my own 
research were chosen because they were widely hailed as pioneering 
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attempts n to cope with technological change. Fortunately, there is little 
duplication in our choice of cases but we did gather similar data. In both 
studies our cases are not restricted to contract clauses that specifically 
mention technological change. Both studies mention the companies by 
name and provide data on the size of the work force. The grouping of 
contract clauses in catégories is similar. However, Cowan's descriptions 
are concise but omit some facts which I included in my own cases (e.g. 
the date of contract changes, or the nature of labour market demand at 
the time of change). Some grouping of results is practical and will be 
attempted. Cowan limits his study to description of the twelve cases with 
no attempt at analysis. I will use his data along with my own findings to 
suggest some relationship between environment characteristics and the 
Ukelihood of certain kinds of contractual provisions. Where possible, I 
will draw on the results of the surveys discussed above as well. 
Copies of my case studies are available in the Appendix to my Report 
to the Task Force on Labour Relations, Project No. 45, Human Adjustment 
to Technological Change. The Cowan studies are available on order from 
the Economie Council of Canada or the Queen's Printer. Readers may 
refer to thèse case descriptions for détails on the expérience in thèse 
companies. 
Most of the studies of collective bargaining attempts to cope with 
technological change either are limited to description of individual cases 
or to surveys which gather statistics or to sweeping assertions unsupported 
by empirical évidence. In reviewing the literature, I could not find anyone 
who had formulated hypothèses concerning the variables which are relevant 
in determining whether collective agreements do include spécial provi-
sions and if so, the nature of thèse provisions. Yet until such hypothèses 
are formulated and tested, very little can be said about how and why 
change influences bargaining in the way it does. Nor will we be able to 
predict the reaction of the parties in any given situation to future techno-
logical change without such an analysis. 
After we undertook this part of the study, my research assistant 
and I soon learned why description or generalization has been preferred 
to analysis. Gathering information on cases is very time consuming. Other 
studies are helpful but each researcher uses his own classification system 
so that it is difficult and sometimes impossible to integrate the research 
11
 Most of the work in compiling the material for the summary of cases 
which I use hère was done by Mr. E. Lightman, a graduate student at the University 
of California, (Berkeley California). 
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of others. The choice of clauses to be included or excluded is always 
arbitrary. Contracts do not provide clearcut évidence of intent and many 
relevant changes occur outside the formai contractual provisions. An 
accurate désignation of the nature of the environment in each case (e.g. 
the degree of product market compétition, or the âge distribution of the 
labour force and so on) require time consuming study in each case. 
With hindsight, I feel that I was perhaps foolhardy in attempting what 
most others hâve avoided. Such an undertaking was especially hazardous 
given the limited resources of time, manpower and data collection facilities 
available to me. Yet I feel that this exercise is of value. The method 
proposed hère, in my opinion, is superior to that used by other students 
of the subject. It is also readily applied to the data collected by the Ca-
nada Department of Labour and other government agencies and if used 
by them with their vast resources, could yield very worthwhile results. 
Several notes of caution must be introduced at this point. First, let 
me repeat my earlier statement that the cases on which the analysis is based 
are not représentative of prevailing practice. Nor do they include ail of 
the instances of pioneering activity. We used those that had been widely 
hailed as innovating agreements. 
We did our best to analyse agreements and utilize published des-
criptions. However, in some cases we may hâve missed relevant contract 
clauses either because they were not mentioned in the secondary source 
(and the agreements were not available) or because our method of class-
ifying clauses may be faulty, although I think, very little that was relevant 
actually slipped by us. 
More serious is the fact that it was impossible to undertake the sort 
of careful studies required to establish the précise nature of the relevant 
environment factors in each case. Thus for example, we hâve designated 
a product or labour market as compétitive or non-competitive on the basis 
of judgements rather than market study. Judgments were also made on 
employment trends in the relevant markets at the time of the agreements. 
We did hâve more précise information on which to assess the scope of 
bargaining, the nature of the unions involved, and the size of the labour 
force. In some cases, we knew that the labour force had many older 
workers and this is indicated. In most cases, we could not establish the 
nature of this variable. 
Finally, because of the small size of the sample of cases, it would 
be a mistake to assume that we hâve adequately tested our hypothèses. The 
data at best provide some highly tentative évidence on thèse hypothèses. 
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THE SAMPLE, THE CLASSIFICATION OF CLAUSES AND 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The following list of cases was used in this study : 
From the Cowan Study : 
Alberta Government Téléphone Commission ; Bowater Mersey Pa-
per Co. Ltd., Liverpool, N.S. ; Canada Johns-Manville Co. Ltd., 
Asbestos, Québec ; Canadian National Railways, London, Ontario ; 
Casavant Frères Limitée, Saint-Hyacinthe, Québec ; Cleyn and Tin-
ker Ltd., Huntingdon, Québec ; Domtar Ltd. ; General Steel Wares 
Ltd. ; Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario ; Impérial Oil 
Ltd. ; Moirs Ltd., Halifax, N.S. ; Pacific Press Ltd., Vancouver, B.C. 
The Kruger-Lightman Cases : 
Kaiser Steel (USA) ; Pacific Maritime Association (USA) ; The 
Basic Steel Industry (USA) ; Armour & Co. Ltd., (USA) ; American 
Motors (USA) ; Impérial Oil Co. Ltd., Ioca, B.C. (Canada) ; 
Québec Iron & Titanium Co. Ltd., Havre St. Pierre, Que. (Canada) ; 
Canadian Railways - Kellock Commission (Canada) ; Domtar Ltd., 
(Canada) (also in Cowan list). 
The Plautz Cases : 
From the Ontario (D. Plautz) study, the following cases could be 
assessed for some variables : 
Méat Products ; Rubber ; Paper and Allied Products ; Printing, Pu-
blishing and Allied Industries ; Primary Métal ; Métal Fabricating ; 
Machinery ; Transportation Equipment ; Petroleum & Coal Products ; 
Chemical & Chemical Products. 
The Contractual Provisions : 
The contract provisions considered relevant are classified under the 
following headings : 
a) Advanced Notice. 
b) Avoiding Layoff : 
Natural Attrition ; Induced Attrition (early retirement) ; Retraining : 
company expense, shared expenses ; Relocation : with allowance, 
without allowance ; Transfer (seniority) ; Work Spreading (shorter 
hours, longer vacations, etc.). 
c) Income Maintenance : 
Severance pay ; S.U.B. ; preferential hiring ; rate rétention : per-
manent, temporary ; short week benefits. 
d) Productivity Sharing. 
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e) Joint Committees : 
créative ; administrative. 
f) Establishment of a Fund. 
The environmental factors considered relevant were : 
a) Compétitive conditions in the product market : 
compétitive ; oligopoly ; monopoly. 
b) Compétitive conditions in the labour market : 
company or industry dominated - oligopsony or monopsony ; many 
employers - compétitive. 
c) Employment trends in the labour market : 
expanding employment opportunities ; contracting (or stagnent) 
labour demand. 
d) Scope of bargaining unit : 
one plant ; more than one plant ; one employer ; more than one 
employer. 
e) Nature of union (s) : 
one union ; more than one union ; craft union (s) ; industrial union (s), 
f ) Labour force âge and size : 
disproportionately older work force ; small bargaining unit (under 
500) ; large bargaining unit (500 or over). 
THE HYPOTHÈSES TO BE TESTED 
The following hypothèses were tested against the limited data 
available. 
a) The greater the degree of product market power, the more likely 
that management will be willling to accept some responsibility for 
change. This is based on the argument that monopoly power is 
correlated with ability to pay and ability to pass on cost increases. 
The latter factor suggests that firms in compétitive sectors are not 
likely to grant such concessions unless they feel that competitors 
will be forced to follow suit (i.e., through industry-wide bargaining 
or pattern bargaining). 
b) Product market power would not influence the choice of procédures 
used to cope with change. 
c) Company (or industry) dominated labour markets would generate 
stronger pressures for company acceptance of some responsibility 
for adjustment to change than would be true in more diversified 
labour markets. Such pressure should be évident in ail the catégories 
of contractual arrangements. 
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d) Firms implementing change in a period of contracting job opport-
unities are more likely to be compelled to accept responsibility for 
assisting the displaced than when job opportunities are expanding. 
This pressure should be particularly évident in the provisions designed 
to avoid layoff and maintain income. 
e) Advanced notice, joint committees and adjustment funds are more 
likely to émerge with cases of a single plant or a single employer 
than with multi-plant or multi-employer bargaining units. In the latter 
instance, it is difficult to secure agreement within management for 
advanced notice and to arrange and implement the machinery for 
continuous consultation or funds. On the other hand relocation and 
retraining might be more prévalent in multi-plant or multi-firm bar-
gaining units. Seniority is almost universally employed but obviously 
the more plants and firms that bargain jointly, the greater the po-
tential scope for using seniority to ease displacement problems. 
f) Craft unions are more likely to emphasize attrition provisions than 
industrial unions as a device for preserving the value of their skills. 
The industrial unions are more likely to seek advanced notice, re-
training and income maintenance programmes to assist workers in 
shifting to new jobs. 
g) A single union is more likely to work out arrangements for advanced 
notice, relocation, rate rétention, productivity sharing, joint com-
mittees and funds than is possible when a company deals with many 
unions. Similarly seniority assumes greater significance with a single 
union than with multiple unions. This is because the inter-union 
negotiations required for thèse provisions makes it less likely that 
they can be implemented in a multi-union situation. 
h) Where the labour force is large, retraining and job transfers are more 
likely than they are with a smaller labour force. On the other hand, 
productivity sharing is more likely in small than in large bargaining 
units because in the former, workers can more readily see the link 
between such factors as technological change or worker effort and 
the bonus from the sharing plan. 
i) The older the work force, the more likely that reliance is placed on 
attrition, work spreading and funds and the less the reliance on re-
training and relocation. 
Thèse hypothèses appeared to be plausible and were tested in thèse 
cases. Not ail of the cases provide data on ail of thèse environmental char-
acteristics so that the number of cases available to test each hypothesis 
is not identical. Again, I wish to emphasize that the data below are not 
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adéquate to provide any définitive conclusions. They do provide some 
tentative évidence concerning the validity of each hypothesis. They may 
also suggest some relationships to the reader that hâve esecaped me. This 
approach provides a framework which could be applied to good advantage 
by those agencies (particularly the Canada Department of Labour) who 
possess information on many more cases. 
THE TEST OF THE HYPOTHÈSES 
The results of the case studies are summarized in the following three 
charts. Chart 1 (in Appendix) cross-classifies the firms (or industries) and 
the contractual clauses. In Chart 2 (in Appendix), I hâve indicated the 
nature of the environment applicable in each case. (I hâve used judgment 
in many of thèse désignations. Anyone who wishes to disagree can readily 
adjust this chart and the following one.) The results of thèse two charts 
are then combined in Chart 3 (in Appendix) where the frequency or 
various contract provisions is platted against the environmental character-
istics. 
We will turn first to an examination of Chart 1. It is obvious that 
the most widely used arrangements for coping with worker displacement 
in the Cowan and Kruger cases are advanced notice, company paid re-
training, internai transfer based on seniority, attrition and joint committees. 
Somewhat less common but f airly popular are induced attrition, relocation 
at company expense and severance pay. Still less common are displace-
ment funds, short week benefits, rate rétention, S.U.B., and work spreading. 
Rare are the instances of shared cost retraining, relocation without allo-
wance, preferential hiring and productivity sharing. 
The Plautz (Ontario) data disclose similar results. Advanced notice 
is by far the most common device. It is found in ail industry groups except 
one and most companies that hâve any provisions at ail provide for ad-
vanced notice. Seniority and severance pay are also important. Rate ré-
tention and preferential hiring get heavier emphasis than in the Cowan-
Kruger cases largely because of their inclusion in many paper and métal 
fabricating contracts respectively. If thèse cases were not included, thèse 
provisions would not be significant. Somewhat surprising is the small 
number of attrition cases in this sample. One suspects that attrition must 
be the practice in many of thèse cases although it does not appear in the 
collective agreements or is not explicitly tied to technological change. 
Thèse findings are not surprising. Seniority is a long established 
device for rationing employment opportunities and has become an ac-
cepted practice even in many non-union establishments. Employers hâve 
always engaged in on-the-job training, both for new workers and for 
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employées transferring among jobs within the firm. The use of seniority 
in job transfer almost invariably assumes some retraining obligation for 
the company. Similarly attrition is a long standing device for coping with 
displacement although contractual arrangements to provide for this are 
of more récent vintage. Advanced notice is a prerequisite for the effect-
iveness of many other arrangements (e.g. retraining, relocation, joint com-
mittees, etc.) and is used in most cases where any kind of displacement 
machinery appears. Joint committees almost invariably are established 
once the principle of advanced notice is accepted. Notice per se is of little 
use unless it is followed by discussion of ways of using the time available 
before the change to good advantage. If anything a more careful analysis 
of practice in thèse cases would almost certainly show that thèse procédures 
are even more widely followed than our data indicate. 
The other kinds of arrangements are somewhat newer and hâve not 
been as widely accepted. Severance pay and preferential hiring hâve a 
somewhat longer history than most of thèse other arrangements. One 
suspects that they are often used even where no mention is made of them 
in the collective agreement. Benefits such as relocation grants, work 
spreading, S.U.B., rate rétention, productivity sharing and displacement 
funds are newer to collective bargainings. Some (such as S.U.B., or rate 
rétention) are resisted by management. Productivity sharing has been 
viewed with suspicion by many unions. 
Little will be said about Chart 2. Readers should note that not only 
is our total sample small but that certain environmental characteristics 
are hardly represented at ail. For example, most of our cases involve firms 
in oligopolistic product markets with only four compétitive and two mono-
polistic cases. Only two of our cases involved instances of multi-employer 
bargaining units. Only four firms had a labour force of under five hundred. 
When thèse weaknesses are combined with the rather off-handed way in 
which some of the classification was done, it should be obvious that the 
data in Chart 3 must be interpreted with caution. 
Chart 3 (with the limitations of data understood) is the most 
interesting of the three summary charts. It is with this data that we can 
test the hypothèses listed above and also perhaps corne up with some al-
ternative hypothèses suggested by the data themselves. First to a test 
of the hypothèses listed in section III, C (3) above. We will designate each 
hypothesis by the same letter of the alphabet as we used earlier. 
a) The greater the degree of product market power, the moire likely 
that such contractual arrangements will be employed. The data are 
inadéquate for any real test. 
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b) The choice of arrangements would not be influenced by product 
market conditions. Again the data are most inadéquate, but the 
évidence is consistent with the hypothesis. 
c) Cases of company dominated labour markets would resuit in more 
fréquent use of displacement procédures. There is some support for 
this, particularly in the areas of advanced notice, attrition, retraining, 
seniority and rate rétention. Strangely enough, in the matter of re-
location grants where one would expect this différence to show up, 
the reverse holds true. This may be because the dominant employers 
are often single plant companies and transfer is not possible. 
d) Displacement in contracting labour markets is more likely to resuit 
in spécial arrangements. The data do not support this. 
e) Advanced notice, joint committees and joint funds are more likely 
to occur when only one plant or one employer is involved. There is 
some support for this in the area of advanced notice. Joint committees 
are not influenced by the number of plants but are somewhat more 
common in single firm than in multi-firm bargaining situations. There 
are too few cases of funds to say much except that the little évidence 
we hâve does not support this. 
f) Craft unions will emphasize attrition, while industrial unions will 
seek advanced notice, retraining and income maitance. There is some 
support for the notion that craft unions will be more likely to em-
phasize attrition although attrition is quite common even where in-
dustrial unions are established. Advanced notice also is found in 
both kinds of unions but if anything is more common in the craft 
union cases. This is also true of retraining. It is true that income 
maintenance programmes are more likely to be found in cases where 
there are industrial unions. 
g) Certain kinds of arrangements are more likely when a single union 
bargains than when a firm (or industry) deals with more than one 
union. This is supported as expected by advanced notice, relocation 
and productivity sharing clauses. There is some flimsy support in 
the areas of rate rétention and displacement funds as well. It is not 
supported in the seniority area. 
h) The size of the labour force will influence the likelihood of finding 
certain provisions. The data supports this but not in the way I ex-
pected. If anything the large firms are less likely to grant retraining 
and seniority transfer than the smaller firms. Nor is it true that pro-
ductivity sharing is more likely in smaller firms. 
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Thèse data for what they are worth support some of our hypothèses 
and negate others. They suggest that if we had a much larger sample and 
a more careful System of classification of the environment, we would also 
hâve to test for interaction among variables. For example, do oligopolistic 
firms also tend to be employers of large numbers of workers and firms 
with more than one plant ? This interaction of variables may be the source 
of some distortion in our data. Also such an approach would permit the 
reformulation of our hypothèses in terms of several variables. The limit-
ations of our data did not justify the attempt at this more sophisticated 
kind of approach. 
OTHER RESULTS OF THE CASE STUDIES 
The summary in Charts 1, 2 and 3 above of necessity omits a 
number of important facts which are disclosed in a careful reading of the 
cases. Among the more significant facts are the following : 
a) Union-management coopération is most effective in cases where dis-
placement involves a reorganization of the labour force but does not 
require workers to leave their firms or communities. The pairties can 
use attrition, transfer through seniority and on-the-job retraining to 
cope with this kind of situation. Managements hâve accepted thèse 
programmes and workers also find them acceptable. 
b) Even in this most favourable kind of situation described in a) above, 
some serious problems may arise. Perhaps the most crucial obstacle 
to success is the existence of narrowly defined seniority units. Often 
even in cases of a single industrial union, seniority is laid out by 
plant or by department. In a multi-union situation, seniority units 
normally do not extend across union boundaries. The problem is 
compounded in the case of craft unions where, on top of narrow 
seniority boundaries one encounters apprenticeship rules, jealously 
guarded jurisdictional boundaries, high union initiation fées and so 
on. Yet successful adjustment to displacement requires as much flex-
ibility as possible in the deployment of the labour force. 
This problem is not insoluble. Some unions hâve shown that 
they can and will alter seniority boundaries in the face of the threat 
of displacement. In the cases of Ontario Hydro, Domtar and Moirs 
Ltd., we hâve évidence of the possibility of inter-union agreement 
to accept the transfer of work and workers across union boundaries 
so that older workers receive as much protection as possible in the 
event of displacement. The Ontario Hydro expérience described by 
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Cowan is particularly instructive as to what can be achieved. Un-
fortunately thèse cases are far from typical. There are many other 
instances (newspaper publishing, railways, airlines, construction) 
where such coopération has not been forthcoming and has frustrated 
attempts to résolve problems. 
Unions themselves must reconsider the questions of union struc-
ture, union jurisdiction, seniority boundaries and inter-union co-
opération in advance of crises. Frankly, I am skeptical about their 
ability to submerge long standing rivalry and short run power ad-
vantage to the long run interests of their members in this matter. 
Other difficult subjects which often inhibit agreements even in 
the favourable sort of cases described above are rate rétention during 
and after retraining, rates on newly created jobs and seniority versus 
merit in deciding who is to be retrained. None of thèse are as tricky 
as the seniority boundary issue. 
c) When displacement involves relocation of workers to a new com-
munity albeit with the same employer and union, the expérience has 
not been encouraging. Agreements often provide for relocation allo-
wances but workers appear reluctant to leave their communities12. 
The General Steel Wares and CNR London cases demonstrate this. 
Unfortunately, the least mobile include the older workers who often 
hâve the greatest difficulty in finding other work in their home towns. 
Inter-regional migration does occur in response to differential em-
ployaient opportunities but there is a time lag in this sort of adjust-
ment. Where there is considérable displacement in areas which other-
wise are enjoying expanding employment opportunities, there is no 
serious problem. Severance pay and unemployment insurance often 
are adéquate to tide men over between jobs. 
When displacement occurs in declining labour markets, then 
collective bargaining appears to be impotent. So far at least few 
union-management coopérative efforts hâve succeeded in arranging 
for significant géographie mobility. It would seem that the induce-
ments required are far in excess of anything most companies would 
12
 There is no need hère to repeat the findings of the numerous studies on 
worker mobility. See WINDER, « Structural Unemployment », Kruger and Meltz, 
The Canadian Labour Market for a review of this literature. 
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be willing or able to pay. The answer hère lies in state programmes 
designed to bring jobs to thèse depressed régions and/or to move 
excess manpower out by providing much greater inducemertts than 
private employer s can offer. 
d) Equally unsuccessful hâve been schemes to provide retraining to 
workers to prépare them for jobs with other employers. Workers 
rarely, if ever, show much willingness to bear any portion of the cost 
of such retraining whether in the form of lost earnings or tuition fées. 
Even where companies provide such opportunities without cost to 
their employées, workers seldom take advantage of thèse programmes. 
The Armour, General Steel Wares and Domtar expérience provide 
examples of the failure of thèse retraining efforts. Workers are willing 
to retrain for a spécifie job with their own firm and often beg for the 
privilège. Some workers hâve shown a willingness to undertake re-
training once unemployed but even hère the drop-out rate is quite 
high. Retraining programmes that focus on developing académie or 
gênerai use technical skills rather thans spécifie skills geared to a 
spécifie job appear to be the least successful. Yet it is precisely such 
gênerai training that receives the blessing of most of our self-pro-
claimed authorities on manpower policy. 
This apparently irrational résistance of workers to retraining is 
difficult to explain. Perhaps the problem should be turned over to 
social scientists of other disciplines (psychology and sociology) for 
an answer. At the risk of being accused of académie imperialism, 
or of trespassing on the jurisdiction of others, I will hazzard a few 
observations on this matter. 
First, workers appear to hâve a short time horizon in making 
plans. They do not appear willing to sacrifice much today for benefits 
in the future because they assume that benefits will not flow for very 
long. This may explain their reluctance to save or invest, and their 
préférence for crédit buying. It may reflect their expérience with 
layoffs involving the loss of accumulated « capital » in the form of 
seniority and fringe benefits on changing employment. It may also 
reflect the increasing selectivity of entrants to the lower skilled jobs 
which are the centre of our attention. Such workers increasingly are 
voluntary drop-outs from formai éducation. They either lack académie 
aptitudes (which explains their résistance in later life to academically 
oriented programmes) or they refused to invest in further académie 
training in their youth because they tended to discount heavily the 
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gain in future income from such investment13. They are then un-
likely to be willing to sacrifice much for training later in life when 
the future period of payoff is in fact even shorter and so soon after 
experiencing the bitterness of displacement. To get workers to make 
the effort, a spécifie job opportunity must be shown and the training 
closely related to success in filling the job. It is this which accounts 
for the success of retraining in the case of in-plant job transfer. 
e) Our sample includes two cases which further demonstrate the point 
just made - namely the need to show workers concrète opportunities 
to elicit their own effort at readjustment prior to displacement. Thèse 
occured in General Steel Wares and Ontario Hydro where the Na-
tional Employment Service was brought in to facilitate adjustment. 
In the General Steel Wares case, the company supplemented N.E.S. 
efforts with its own approach to other prospective employers. Wor-
kers were enabled to secure job interviews and offers of employment 
before being displaced. The programmes were successful. Success 
was, of course, predicated on the existence of alternative employment 
opportunities in the community. 
If retraining is to succeed (in cases where a change of employer 
is necessary) it must be tied to such a programme. The actual re-
training should be done by the new employer rather than the firm 
laying the men off, although varying schemes for financing retraining 
can be used. Workers are more likely to accept retraining if it is tied 
to a job with the firm insisting on the retraining. Furthermore the 
training is bound to be more relevant to the new jobs if done by the 
firms with the jobs available than if done by the firm laying off man-
power. The new employers are in a better position to define training 
requirements and are more likely to hâve the equipment and ins-
tructors to do the training than are the former employers of thèse 
workers. They also hâve a stronger incentive to ensure that training 
is efficient. 
The Ontario Hydro and General Steel Wares use of N.E.S. pro-
vides one of the few inspiring innovations encountered in this study. 
Paradoxically, this approach is much less costly to management and 
less disruptive to the workers than many of the more popular con-
13 Major exceptions are récent immigrants and disadvantaged groups (U.S. 
Negroes, or Indians, etc.) who may hâve the aptitudes but lacked opportunities or 
found that the « costs » (including breaking strong cultural patterns) were unduly 
high. 
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tractual arrangements. The widespread use of advanced notice and 
joint committees provides the basis for more experiments of this kind 
in the future. 
f) Funds available to cope with displacement problems were established 
in four of the cases studied. While this approach has received con-
sidérable publicity, nothing startling has been accomplished in any 
of thèse cases. 
The Armour plan provides for considérable flexibility in the 
use of the funds. Much careful effort was expended in devising pro-
grammes to assist the displaced. However ail published reports in-
dicate that there was very limited success in spite of good will, expert 
assistance and large expenditures. 
The Kaiser and Pacific Maritime plans are tried to productivity 
gains. In the Kaiser case, the funds are used for bonuses to elicit 
worker effort and coopération in the way that the well known Scanlon 
Plan opérâtes 14. Along with the fund, Kaiser has accepted an oblig-
ation not to lay off its existing work force for reasons of technological 
change but to use attrition to accomplish any necessary réductions. 
The fund does nothing to ease displacement which can occur for rea-
sons of declining demand or which can hit newly hired workers as 
a resuit of any cause including technological change. 
The Pacific Maritime fund is somewhat more closely tied in 
with displacement adjustment programme. Some of the funds are 
used to induce early retirement where necessary, while the balance 
are available to maintain the incomes of union members who are 
laid off for reasons of technological change. There is no protection 
for union members against layoff resulting from other causes. More 
important, the large group of « B » longshoremen are excluded from 
union membership and from any protection against displacement. 
Thus the fund and the other contract provisions help an élite group 
but provide no protection for those workers most likely to be hit by 
displacement. 
In Canada, the major case involving the création of a fund is 
at Domtar. Hère the fund is to be used for any devices the parties 
may feel will facilitate the adjustment of displaced workers. Thus 
far the future of this plan is uncertain because of the failure of a 
14
 The Scanlon Plan is discussed briefly in the volume by F. Lesieur (éd.), 
The Scanlon Plan, Cambridge, Mass. : M.I.T. Press, 1958. 
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number of unions to accept some of the terms. Domtar provides a 
very interesting case of a large multi-plant, multi-product company 
organized by a large number of unions (many of them at loggerheads 
with each other). The environment would appear to be most unfa-
vourable to success. Yet in spite of the current deadlock, the fact that 
negotiations hâve proceeded as far as they hâve and that the majority 
of unions appear ready to make the concessions necessary (including 
some loss of autonomy and acceptance of inter-union seniority) is 
truly remarkable. 
g) Attrition is widely used as a device to ease displacements problems. 
Actually what it does is redistribute the burden of displacement. The 
older workers, often against their desires, are compelled or induced 
to accept displacement. Their retirement is accompanied by pensions 
to make it more palatable but it does not alter the fact of their dis-
placement. Such plans are, in effect, a form of S.U.B. designed to be 
paid to those with the lowest life expectancy and therefore to those 
who are least expensive to support in this matter. It fits in with the 
accepted notions that the aged are entitled to financial support, with 
equity concepts concerning the prior right to employment of those 
with more dependents than the aged usually hâve and with the em-
ployers' préférence for keeping younger rather than older workers 
if faced with the choice. Nonetheless, it still involves displacement. 
To the extent that the displaced are assisted, it is through the pension 
plans and not through attrition per se. 
The attrition policy also raises the issue of « silent firings » or 
displacement of potential workers often young new entrants to the 
labour force. It is argued that, to the extent that people would hâve 
been fired on in the absence of technological change, but are not 
employed because of the change, there is displacement as a resuit of 
of the change. Thèse people, of course, receive no protection from 
any of the contractual arrangements since they were not covered by 
the relevant agreements. 
Other Proposais — An Evaluation 
The extensive discussion of technological change in récent years has 
generated a number of proposais for handling the problem. The Freedman 
Report (Report of the Industrial Inquiry Commission on Canadian Raii-
ways « Run Throughs » ) and the statements by the Economie Council 
of Canada provide two widely publieized examples of such proposais. 
It is impossible to treat ail of the plans hère but I feel that some con-
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sideration should be given to thèse two widely discussed Canadian schemes. 
Some référence will be made to other plans as well. 
THE FREEDMAN REPORT 
Although Freedman addressed himself to a particular displacement 
problem in a single industry, there has been considérable discussion of 
his proposais and their possible extension beyond the railway case. Freed-
man deals with several contentious issues including : 
( i) the residual rights versus common law approach to collective agree-
ments ; 
( ii) the rights of unions and workers threatened by displacement ; 
(iii) the rights of a community threatened by displacement ; 
(iv) the responsibilities of companies, unions and the state in assisting 
worker adjustment to displacement. 
We will deal with each of thèse in turn. 
( i) Freedman concèdes that under existing law the residual rights doc-
trine prevails and supports managements contention that it can make 
any changes unilaterally unless specifically restricted by the terms of 
contract. He sees the necessity of preserving management's residual 
rights yet also accepts the merit in the union's contention that wor-
kers hâve property rights in their jobs which must be respected. The 
conflict is particularly sharp in the event of technological change. 
Freedman proposes that - management give thirty days advanced 
notice of such change and discuss with the union methods of fa-
cilitating adjustement 
— if an arbitrator finds that the proposed change will resuit in sub-
stantial displacement and if the parties cannot agrée on arrangements 
for implementing the change, that the company be compelled to delay 
the introduction of new processes until after the agreement expires 
and the union can bargain over the issue with the support of a 
strike threat. 
Both proposais are radical. While many companies might accept 
advanced notice, few would like to be compelled to do so by law. 
More significant is the second proposai which would resuit in delaying 
any major changes until the expiration of agreements. This in effect 
destroys management's residual rights where major technological 
change is the issue. It may also resuit in sizeable économie losses to 
the company as a resuit of the imposed delay. To overeome this 
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objection, Mr. Marchand has proposed that in the event management 
asks to implement a major change, the contract expires immediately 
and the parties open negotiations on this and related issues with a 
view to concluding a new agreement. 
Thèse proposais deserve considération. Earlier I argued that in 
most cases, companies know of impending changes long before they 
are prepared to implement them. A légal requirement of thirty days 
advanced notice should not prove to be unduly onerous. As for 
making such changes negotiable, the « Marchand amendment » is 
préférable to the original Freedman plan. Marchanda proposai makes 
major change negotiable without necessarily imposing undue delays. 
There are several problems raised by thèse proposais. First 
there is the difficulty in distinguishing between a minor change 
(where residual rights govern) and a « material » change. Then there 
is the danger that management may implement change in stages with 
each step involving a minor altération but with « material » change 
occurring over time. Arbitrâtes may hâve problems deciding thèse 
questions. Any adéquate décision will involve lengthy hearings which 
themselves impose delays. 
( ii) The Report says that unions and workers hâve the rigth to advance 
notice (as discussed above) in the event of technological change. 
Displaced workers should be assisted in géographie mobility by the 
company. Specifically moving costs including loss of capital value of 
housing or expenses in breaking leases should be covered. Freedman 
contends that thèse workers should not bear the full cost of change 
and that management must be prepared to spend some of its économie 
benefits resulting from the change on thèse workers. He implies that 
if the cost of assisting displaced workers in this way exceeds the 
benefits to the company of making the change, then the change should 
not be made. He limits himself to the railways and does not face up 
to the problems of industries where import compétition or entry are 
more likely to create pressures for technological change. He neglects 
the évidence on the unwillingness of workers to move even if incentives 
are provided. The Report dévotes little attention to other adjustment 
programmes. 
(iii) In cases where a single firm is a major employer in a community, 
company décisions may adversely affect the community destroying 
considérable investment in social overhead capital (schools, roads, 
etc.). Freedman recognizes the community interest in thèse cases 
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and recommends advanced notice to the community. In the railway 
case, he suggests a device for delaying change in such cases but his 
proposai is not immediately applicable to other industries. He does 
not résolve the problem of ensuring the protection of community 
interests. Nor does he really treat systematically the question of 
forcing companies to consider thèse social costs in their décisions. 
The subject of « externalities » is of great importance in assessing 
many private décisions (pollution, safety, etc., as well as worker 
displacement) and one that economists recognize as extremely difficult 
to treat analytically. If ail social costs had to be considered before 
any change could be made, few innovations would ever be adopted. 
On the other hand, if external effects are completely ignored, many 
socially undesirable changes will occur. 
(iv) Companies, unions and governments are urged to accept some 
responsibility for promoting change and facilitating worker adaptation 
to change. Managements responsibilities as seen by the Report hâve 
been indicated above. Unions are encouraged to cooperate with 
management and to accept necessary changes in their philosophy and 
structure. Freedman was particularly concerned about union insistence 
on narrow seniority units on the railways which frustrated attempts 
to cope with displacements. 
The state was to assist in manpower adjustment and was to 
reimburse companies for any économie losses resulting from imposed 
delays in implementing change. This would induce companies to accept 
delay and to work out arrangements with communities and unions 
to minimize their hardships. One wonders how one could establish 
the size of this subsidy and prevent serious abuses by companies. 
It seems to me that there is enough time in most situations to permit 
adéquate advanced notice without any loss by the company or any 
necessity for compensation. If compensation is to be paid, the onus 
should be on the companies concerned to demonstrate losses attribut-
able to imposed delays that would not otherwise hâve occurred. 
In summary, the Freedman Report is thoughtful and thought-provok-
ing. It combines a diagnosis of the problems of the parties immediately 
involved with considération of social costs and social concerns. The analysis 
is not explicit nor précise on this matter but Freedman does demonstrate 
an awareness of the complex problem. Although his principle concern is 
the railways, much of the discussion has broader significance. I would be 
prepared to accept compulsory advanced notice. There is merit in the 
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suggestions that material change should be subject tô the bargaining process 
(including the threat of stoppage) and that it is unreasonable to permit 
unilatéral management action on major changes during the term of contract. 
Unless something is done hère, we may anticipate bitter strikes over the 
principle of residual rights. Although I am critical of the Reporfs failure 
to cope adequately with the problem of introducing social costs into 
managements décisions, I concède that this is a problem where our 
analytical tools remain underdeveloped. 
THE ECONOMIC COUNCIL 
The Economic Council of Canada has issued three publications 
relevant to this topic. The first and most significant was A Déclaration 
on Manpower Adjustments to Technological and Other Change issued 
November 1966. The Council discusses the various provisions that hâve 
been used in collective bargaining and urges wider adoption of thèse 
adjustment provisions. The Déclaration adds to our earlier list of 
contractual arrangements the use of portable pensions to facilitate labour 
mobility. Great stress is placed on the need for advanced notice and joint 
consultation. The Déclaration states that normally management knows 
of impending change well in advance of implementation so that advanced 
notice is not unduly burdensome. The fact that représentatives of man-
agement joined union officiais in signing the Déclaration lends support to 
our earlier argument that economic theory suggests the existence of a 
substantial time lag in most cases. The Council statement notes that public 
policies designed to promote full employment are the key to the success 
of any programmes designed to facilitate the adjustment of displaced 
workers. 
The basic rôle of Keynesian policies in this matter is something that 
almost ail economists can agrée on. Other programmes are designed to 
shift displaced workers to vacant positions. No such shift is possible unless 
the vacancies exist or are created. The spread of portable (vested) pensions 
would be useful. However, it would tend to raise the cost of pension 
plans and perhaps limit the ability to resort to induced attrition. There is 
little to quarrel with in this Déclaration but there is little that is new, 
revolutionary or thought provoking. 
The Council issued another statement in February 1967. This 
document entitled Toward Better Communications Between Labour And 
Management asserts repeatedly that better communication provides good 
results for ail concerned and contributes to a long list of goals including 
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adjustment to displacement. Little proof is offered in support of thèse 
statements. In my opinion much that is said shows either naivete on the 
part of those formulating the document, or else a préférence for consensus 
on gênerai, rather harmless assertions over a careful examination of the 
problems. Hère I will limit myself to the comment that improved commun-
ications can make a material différence only where the parties hâve shared 
objectives unknown to themselves which can be discovered by discussion. 
Where there is genuine disagreement, communications per se are unlikely 
to help much and indeed can be harmful by pointing out areas of 
disagreement that were not apparent. 
In March 1967, the Council published Jean-Real Cardin's study 
Canadian Labour Relations in an Era of Technological Change. Cardin 
argues that the failure of collective bargaining in this area is largely the 
resuit of the interaction of outmoded union and management philosophy 
and archaic institutional structures. Bargaining units are relativeiy small 
and the focus in bargaining is on the goals of « actors » at the micro-level, 
(firm, craft, etc.). Adversary rôles are emphasized with discussion confined 
to the infrequent periods when contracts must be redrawn. 
His solution lies in broadening both the bargaining units and the 
perspective of the parties. The Swedish system appears to be his model 
of the idéal although he does not explicitly state this. 
Although much can be gained by expanding bargaining units so 
that mobility is facilitated, I see little in Cardin's proposais that are 
likely to improve the situation. Our unions and companies are unlikely 
to accept national bargaining on the Swedish pattern. Hère the présence 
of international corporations and international unions does make a différ-
ence although other factors also operate to inhibit centralization. Cardin 
puts great stress on communication as désirable per se, something I hâve 
already questioned. Finally, we should not confuse the functions of the 
state (with or without the participation of interest groups) in setting macro 
policies and the function of unions and collective bargaining in seeking 
to assist workers in coping with what is unique to their own situation. 
In the drive for centralization, we may lose much that is healthy and usefui 
in our currently decentralized arrangements. In our attempt to remake 
collective bargaining so that it can cope with displacement we may destroy 
its ability to perform what it has done so well in the past. 
Cardin's basic proposais are unlikely to be followed. I am not 
convinced that they would prove effective even if they did materialize. 
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Summary 
The following appear to be the major findings of this study : 
a) Measuring the rate of technological change at the macro or micro 
level is difficult. 
b) The employment impact of technological change is almost impossible 
to separate from other factors causing displacement. 
c ) Technological change is not inherently labour displacing. 
d) Normally, in cases of major change, there is a considérable period 
between the décision to alter technology and the actual implementation 
of this décision. 
e) Dislocation can arise from a variety of sources in addition to technol-
ogical change. The problem we face is dislocation regardless of its 
source, and not technological change per se. 
f ) Firms making the change may not always be highly profitable. Often 
they act under the stimulus of losses. 
g) Where entry into an industry is possible (or import compétition 
exists), new entrants (or foreign competitors) use the latest techniques 
with no demand on them to compensate displaced workers. Older 
firms shifting to new techniques are asked to implement costly 
assistance programmes. Often thèse firms are simultaneously burdened 
by the compétitive disadvantage of heavy fixed changes associated 
with the purchase and use of older techniques. This two fold pressure 
to overcome the burden of fixed costs and to assist displaced workers 
when competitors face neither pressure can create serious hardships 
for thèse firms. 
h) Worker costs and benefits associated with change dépend on worker 
values, prior training and expérience, and conditions in the relevant 
labour markets. Hardest hit are the lowest skilled and the least 
willing to move. Managements décisions are motivated primarily by 
profit maximization. The government's approach is contingent on the 
relative importance attached to a variety of social and économie goals 
as well as on the political pressures of the moment. 
i ) Most of the studies of collective bargaining and displacement are of 
two kinds. Some are limited to case descriptions. Others proclaiin 
gênerai principles or panaceas on the strength of hunches rather than 
tested hypothèses. Définition, methods of classification and methods 
of analysis are not comparable. No theoretical structure guides the 
studies. Thus little can be done to integrate them or to employ their 
findings in testing hypothèses. This Report contains a déficient but 
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nonetheless valuable beginning at a more systematic attack. There is 
some évidence that certain of the environmental variables are sign-
ificant in predicting the likeUhood of particular kinds of contractual 
provisions. 
j ) Our cases also produced other findings : 
- Displacement that does not involve moving out of one's community 
or shifting to another employer (or union) are the easiest to cope 
with through collective bargaining. 
- Workers do not take advantage of mobility grants. This means that 
when displacement occurs in an area with few alternative employ-
ment opportunities, collective bargaining is virtually impotent in 
assisting workers. 
- Workers are not likely to accept retraining unless they are certain 
that training is tied to a spécifie job vacancy, preferably at a firrn 
that employs them and provides the retraining. 
- Limited seniority units particularly in multi-union situations inhibit 
adjustment arrangements. Although there hâve been some notable 
instances of success in altering union policies, thèse are few in 
number and more than matched by the cases of failure to adjust 
even in the face of severe displacement problems. 
- More use should be made of the facilitïes of the Manpower Centres 
and of company and union contacts in the labour market to facil-
itate worker adjustment. The Ontario Hydro and General Steel 
Wares cases might be emulated by others. 
- Displacement funds hâve not accomplished much of significance 
thus far. 
- Attrition is a mechanism for allocating the burden of displacement 
and not a remedy. 
k) The Freedman Report touches on a number of important issues and 
makes some interesting proposais. It urges compulsory advanced 
notice arrangements and rejects managements residual rights in cases 
where a change will resuit in material displacement. Thèse are radical 
suggestions. The Report touches on the question of community costs 
associated with such change and the need to bring considération of 
thèse to bear on managements décisions. This issue is not resolved 
in the Report. 
- The work of the Economie Council of Canada thus far is dis-
appointing. The Council has pressed for the wider use of some 
of the procédures followed in the cases we hâve examined. It has 
pushed some questionable panaceas which hâve little basis in 
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careful analysis and little likelihood of ever being implemented. 
The most valuable contribution it has made is in pointing out the 
crucial rôle of government aggregate demand policies in determin-
ing the degree of possible success of collective bargaining in this 
area. 
L'ASPECT ÉCONOMIQUE DE L'ADAPTATION AU 
CHANGEMENT TECHNOLOGIQUE 
L'adaptation aux changements technologiques n'est pas un sujet nouveau. La 
hausse du chômage de 1957-60 et le développement technologique ont amené ce 
débat, il y a déjà dix ans. Les économistes ont discuté le rôle relatif des facteurs 
structurels et de l'insuffisance de la demande aggrégative comme cause majeure de 
ce chômage. Les keynésiens ont prôné des politiques fiscales et monétaires, les 
structuralistes ont avancé des politiques de main-d'œuvre comme solutions à ce 
problème, tandis que d'autres remettent en question la situation en suggérant 
l'approche de la société des loisirs. 
Nous n'avons pas l'intention de régler ces vastes questions ici. Nous faisons 
l'hypothèse que l'emploi rémunéré va continuer à jouer un rôle important dans 
notre société et que les changements technologiques et autres vont continuer à 
causer des déplacements de main-d'œuvre. Le but de cet article est double : d'abord, 
examiner comment la négociation collective a traité ce problème de déplacement ; 
ensuite, voir quel genre de tendance les changements mentionnés peuvent inculquer 
aux relations du travail et à la négociation collective. 
Nous examinons d'abord l'aspect coût-bénéfice des changements technologiques. 
Nous concluons que la théorie économique de la firme nous porte à croire que, 
dans la majorité des cas, le côté patronal a tout le temps disponible de planifier 
en fonction des changements causant de sérieux déplacements. Il est à noter que 
les entreprises qui font des changements ne sont pas toujours celles qui ont les 
plus grandes marges de profit. Quand l'entrée dans le marché est facile et la 
concurrence étrangère sérieuse, la firme qui introduit d'importants changements 
fait face à de sérieux désavantages vis-à-vis ses concurrents. 
Ensuite, vient une analyse de conventions collectives basée sur des inventaires 
des gouvernements fédéral et ontarien. Il s'agit de vérifier neuf hypothèses afin de 
voir, entre autres choses, l'influence des différents contextes sur le contenu de la 
négociation collective et la direction qu'elle prend. L'analyse de cas spécifiques met 
en évidence quelques-unes des raisons principales pour les faillites et les succès 
de la négociation collective face aux changements technologiques 
La discussion continue par une analyse des principales solutions canadiennes au 
problème des déplacements de main-d'œuvre et un résumé des principales conclusions : 
a) l'évaluation du taux de changement technologique aux niveaux macro et micro 
est difficile ; 
b) il est presque impossible de distinguer entre l'impact des changements techno-
logiques sur l'emploi et les autres causes de déplacement de main-d'œuvre ; 
c) il y a une grande période d'attente entre l'innovation et l'implantation des 
nouvelles technologies ; 
d) les changements technologiques n'impliquent pas nécessairement des déplace-
ments de main-d'œuvre ; 
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e) il y a plusieurs causes à ces déplacements autres que les changements techno-
logiques ; 
f) les entreprises qui introduisent les changements technologiques ne sont pas 
toujours celles qui ont les plus grandes marges de profit; 
g) les plus anciennes firmes dans un marché subissent la double pression des 
innovations technologiques et de l'assistance aux déplacements de travailleurs ; 
h) les travailleurs non-qualifiés sont les plus affectés par les changements d'emploi 
et plus résistants face aux déplacements géographiques ; 
i) l'absence de cadre théorique pour étudier l'impact de la négociation collective 
sur les taux de déplacement empêche toute comparaison et l'intégration des 
différentes études. Cet article n'est qu'un premier pas dans ce sens. Il semble 
y avoir une corrélation positive entre certains genres de clauses dans les 
conventions collectives et certaines variables contextuelles ; 
j ) les déplacements de main-d'œuvre qui n'impliquent pas de mobilité géographique 
sont les plus faciles à solutionner par la négociation collective ; 
k) les travailleurs ne se servent pas des primes à la mobilité. Ceci implique 
l'impuissance de la négociation collective lorsqu'il y a déplacement de main-
d'œuvre dans une région à basse opportunité d'emploi ; 
1) les travailleurs vont accepter le recyclage seulement si un emploi leur est 
assuré ; 
m) l'existence d'unités d'ancienneté limite les possibilités d'adaptation surtout dans 
les cas de pluralisme syndical ; 
n) on devrait faire un plus grand usage des Centres de main-d'œuvre et des 
contacts que les syndicats et la compagnie ont avec le marché du travail pour 
faciliter l'adaptation des travailleurs ; 
o) les fonds de déplacement n'ont pas eu d'impact à date ; 
p) l'usure de la main-d'œuvre n'est pas un remède aux déplacements. 
Le rapport Freedman et le Conseil économique du Canada ont également étudié 
ce problème. L'un contient, entre autres, quelques recommandations radicales, alors 
que le travail du second est très désappointant. 
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Alberta Téléphone | x| |x|x| |x| | |x| | | I I lx 
Bowater x | x x xl I I I I lx 
Can. Johns-Mansvi le | xl |x| | |x| | | | j x| xl I I I I lx 
CNR-London, Ont. J x| |x|x| |x| | |x| | x| I x! I lx 
Casavant Frères | xl | | | |x| | | | | x| I lx 
Cleyn & Tinker | x| |x| j |x| | | | | x| xl I I I lx 
General Steelware 1 xl Ixlxl Ex j 1 Ixl 1 xl I xl I I lx 
Hydro-Ont. | x| |x| J |x| j | | | x| x I lx 
Impérial Oil | x| |x|x| | |x| |x| | x| I xl x 
Moirs Ltd. j x| |x| | | | | | | | x| 
Pacific Press | x| |x| | |x| | | | | x| I xl I lx 
American Motors vl X xl x 
Armour 1 xl 1 Ixl Ixl 1 |x| 1 xl I xl x I I lx x 
Basic Steel | | | | | | | 1 I I 1 | x I lx 
Oomtar | x| j x jx j |x| | |x| | x| I lx x 
Jmperial Oil - loco | x| |x|x| |x| | | | | x| I xl I lxl I lx x 
Kaiser Steel | | |x| | |x| | | | | | I I x I lx lx xl lx x 
Pacific Maritime | | |x|x| | | | | |x| | I I lx x x 
Québec Iron | | | | | | l ! I l 1 1 I I lx 
flailways-Kellock | | jx j | |x| | | | | x| i x Ixlxl 
PLAUTZi 
Chemical Industry *\\\\- 1] 5 - I 3 2 3| | | 1 j I 94 
Machinery Î 3 I 11 i2i 11 m i 4 i - I "I 5 -| | | ~l I 106 
Méat Products i 6 i i i I - I i i I - I i - i - I 6 I - 2| | | - I I 33 
Métal Fab. |13| | | |8| | | |5| | 18 | - I 2 I 12 2| | | "I I 252 
Paper & Allied l55l l1l l2l I I hl l 2 h | 21 | - 25| | | —I I 99 
Petrol. & Coal 12i 11 m 11 I-I M I - I ~"l - 1| | | "I I 11 
Primary Metals I 7I I l l4M I H I 8 h I 2 I 2 5| | | ~l I 92 
Printing, etc. l33l l6l l6l I I H I - I 4 |19| - 1| | | —I I 231 
Rubber I 3I I I I-I I I I-I I 7 I - I "I 2 "I I I 2| | 29 
Trans. Equip. I - I I I l2l I I l9l I 7 I - I ~! 8 "I I I MM 76 
For the Plautz cases, I hâve indicated the number of establishments studied in each industry 
and the number with each kind of provision in each industry. 
This table relates the companies or industries to the différent kinds of arrangements found 
in agreements. The V indicates a contract clause which predates the agreements discussed 
in the Appendix. The x indicates that the clause was negotiated in the contracts dealt with 
in the description in the Appendix. It was not possible to analyse agreements in ail cases 
and undoubtedly more it should be included particularly in areas like seniority and severance 
pay. 
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Alberta Téléphone 1 x l Ix Ix 1 1 l x l x l 1 1 l x l x 1 lx 
Bowater I x x l xl Ixl Ixl 1 I Ix x l x 1 lx 
Can. Johns-Mansville I x x l xl Ixl Ixl 1 Ixl lx 1 lx 
CNR - London, Ont. 1 X Ix 1 1 l x l x l 1 1 l x x l x l x l 
Casavant Frères 1 1 lx l lx l 1 lx l lx l x l 
Cleyn & Tinker Ix x l xl 1 lx lx l 1 lxl l x 
General Steelwares 1 X Ix Ix 1 1 x l x l 1 lx l lx l x l X 
Hydro - Ont. 1 x l x 
x 
1 1 l x l x l 1 1 l x x l 1 lx 
Impérial Oil 1 X x| | |x|x| | | [x lx 1 lx 
Moirs Ltd. 1 Ix x| |x| |x| | | |x x l 1 lx 
Pacific Press 1 X x l 1 lx l lx l 1 1 l x x l x 1 lx 
American Motors X X X X X X X x 
Armour Ix Ix x| | jxjxj | | |x lx 1 lx 
Basic Steel 1 X x l x| | |x| |x| |x| lx 1 lx 
Domtar 1 X x l x xl 1 j x]xj 1 1 lx x l x 1 lx 
Impérial Oil — loco 1 X 1 lx l lx l 1 lx l lx l x l 
Kaiser Steel 1 X Ix Ix 1 lx l lx l 1 lx l lx 1 lx 
Pacific Maritime 1 Ix Ix 1 1 1 1 lx l lx l l x 1 lx Québec Iron 1 X Ix Ix 1 1 l x l x l 1 1 l x lx 1 lx 
Railways-Kellock 1 X Ix 1 1 1 lx l 1 1 l x x l x 1 lx 
Chemical Industry X 
Machinery " 1 X 1 11111 II 
Méat Products " Ix 1 11111 I I 
Métal Fab. " | X 1 11111 I I 
Paper & Allied " 1 X 1 11111 II 
Petrol. & Coal " 1 X 1 11111 II 
Primary Metals " 1 X 1 11111 I I 
Printing, etc. " Ix 1 11111 II 
Rubber " I X 1 11111 II 
Trans. Equlp. " 1 X 1 11111 II 
* This Chart assigns environmental characteristics to each case. Judgment was used in many 
instances. In some cases, particular environmental factors are not designated because of 
lack of information. 
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A. Advanced Notice |2| 8 |2| |b I 7I l2l7l |6| 8|14|0| |5| 9|6|11 I l4l 9 I1 I I1 4 
B. Avoiding Layoff 
Natural Attrition | 1 | y l2l lb I 7I l4l5l |5| 0 j 13 |1 | |6| 8|6|12 I l4 l10 l1 l |14 
Induced Attrition j 01 5 I1! I1 | . 7 | |3 |3 | | 1 | 0| 7 | 1 | |3| 5|2| 8 I l3l 5I1I I 8 
Retraining I I I I I ! I I I I M ! I I ! I I I I I I I 
Co. Paid |2|10 |2| |6 I 9 I I4 5I |6| 1J15|0 |6 | 9|6|14 4|11 1 15 
Shared Cost |0| 1 |0| |0 I 1l l° 1l I 1l° |0| 1|0| 1 I ! 1 
Relocation I I I I I l I I I I I I I I 
With Allowance 1| 5 i1l I1 6| |2 4I 0 6| 7|0 |2| 5|2| 7 2| 5 1 7 
Without Allowance I I I l° 1 l I1 °l 0 1 | 0|1 | 1 | 0 |0| 1 I 1 1 Transfer (Seniority) 2|11 1 l I7 9| |2 8I 6 9I15J1 |6|10|7|14 4|12 1 16 
Work Spreading |0| 3 |0| |0 I 3I I1 2I |0 3| 2|1 |2| 1|0| 3 Oj 3 3 
C. Income Maintenance 
Severance Pay 1 | 6 0| |1 6| |1 3I 2 5| 6|1 |3| 4 |2 | 7 3| 4 1 7 
S.U.B. 1 | 3 0| |1 4 | |2 3I 1 3| 3|2 |4 | 1|0| 5 0| 5 5 
Preferential Hiring 0| 1 1 l I1 1 l !" -| 0 1 | 2|0 |0| 2 |2| 0| | 0| 2 2 
Rate Rétention i 1 | 2 0| |3 0| |0 3I 2 1| 3|0j |2 | 1 |1 | 2| | 1 | 2 3 
Permanent I 1 0| |0 1 l I I 0 0| 1|0| |0| 1 |1 | 0| | I 1 l 1 
Temporary I 3 0| |0 3| |1 I 2 0| 3|0 |2| 1 |1 | 2| | I 2 3 
Short Work Benefits 0| 2 0| |1 2| |1 1l 1 1 | 1|2| |3| 0|0| 3| | °l 3I 3 
D. Productivity Sharing 0| 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 2 Oj 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 
E. Joint Committees ! I l 
Creative |2|11 2| |7 9| |4| 7I l6l 10j15|1| |8| 8|5|15| | 4|12| 1| 16 
Administrative | | 2|0| |0| 3| | 1 | i m 1| 2 | 1 | j2 | 1|0| 3| | 1 | 2| 3 
F. Establishment of Fund 1 3 0 1 3 2 2 1| 2 3 1| 2 2 1 4 0 4 I 4 
Total No. of Cases 2 13 2 7 12 5| 9 7| 11 18|2| 9 11 7|18: 4 15| 1 | 20 
* This Chart combines informat ion f rom Charts 1 and 2 to relate the envi ronment and the 
response. Only the Cowan and Kruger cases are included hère. The Plautz (Ontar io) cases 
could not be used. 
i Rate rétention covers cases where it is unclear whether i t is permanent of temporary. Where 
th is is clear it is so l is ted. Thus total cases of rate rétention of any k ind is seven. 
* NOTE: Some companies hâve both craft and industr ial unions. 
